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A cognitive-political model of evidentiary 
bias 
The overt politics of evidence  
By conceptualising the policy process as an arena 
through which competition occurs, it becomes apparent 
that participation in policy debates is not driven by a 
desire to be technically accurate, but by a need for 
political success or even survival. From this perspective, 
many forms of evidentiary bias are predictable. When 
interest groups have much to lose from a policy decision 
– such as corporate actors resisting product regulation - 
the strategic use of evidence should indeed be expected, 
and can be argued to be ‘rational’ when policy decisions 
may determine the political or financial survival of 
involved actors. Similarly, for those already in positions 
of authority, political survival may depend on the use of 
cherry-picked or piecemeal evidence. Within political 
systems, individuals often face pressure to manipulate 
evidence in order to show positive programme results or, 
alternatively, to hide unwanted findings. Further, in 
extreme cases, where political interests are so 
challenged by bodies of evidence, a strategy to 
undermine faith in scientific practice as a whole may be 
pursued – as seen in the debates over tobacco control or  
Biased uses of evidence can undermine the policy process and lead to seemingly intractable debates over policy 
issues. As such, it is increasingly important to consider the different forms of bias that arise in policy arenas, and the 
mechanisms by which political factors generate these biases. Brief 2 delineated two forms of evidentiary bias within 
political decision-making: technical bias – which represents violations of scientific best practice, including 
manipulation, cherry picking, or erroneous uses of evidence; and issue bias – representing the ways that the 
prioritisation or selection of particular forms or bodies of evidence can bias policy agendas in unseen ways. Evidentiary 
bias may arise via both overt and subtle mechanisms. Overt mechanisms are seen in the fundamentally competitive 
nature of policymaking, as actors and stakeholders compete to achieve political victories and results that advance 
their personal, corporate, or ideological interests. Such an environment can drive the biased use of evidence through 
deliberate strategies. Subtle mechanisms, on the other hand, capture the unconscious processes that affect human 
thinking and information processes, which are shaped by our underlying values, expectations, desires, or needs. By 
understanding these origins and mechanisms of evidentiary bias in policy arenas, we can construct a ‘cognitive-
political framework’ to help identify features of policy debates that may bring about bias. This model may help to 
guide strategies aiming to prevent or mitigate the impact of such forms of evidentiary bias. 
 
 Evidentiary bias in policymaking may arise 
through both overt (deliberate) and subtle 
(unconscious) mechanisms. 
 
 Complex, important, and highly polarised policy 
issues are particularly susceptible to bias through 
overt and subtle mechanisms. 
 
 A cognitive-political model of evidentiary bias 
may be used as a tool to help mitigate or avoid 
bias in future policymaking.  
At a glance  
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climate change [1]. 
Competition and contestation can also drive cases of 
issue bias, whereby the creation, selection, and use of 
(technically valid) evidence can serve to direct policy 
attention to a limited number of key concerns, to 
prioritise outcomes of interest, or to obscure other 
relevant policy considerations. The term ‘evidence-based 
advocacy’ is often used to refer to efforts to provide 
research to influence policy in line with particular 
agendas. In these cases, groups deliberately promote the 
use of issue-specific evidence to shape policy decisions 
towards preferred interests [2], or use the credibility that 
comes from embracing scientific evidence to make a 
particular position appear more legitimate.  
The subtle politics of evidence  
In addition to bias arising from the deliberate pursuit of a 
preferred policy outcome, there can also biased uses of 
evidence with less obvious origins. This more ‘subtle’ bias 
can arise through intuitive and unconscious mechanisms 
by which individuals’ value systems, or their group 
identities, bias their understandings and interpretations 
of evidence. Cognitive psychologists have explored how 
heuristics (simplifying processes) can lead to biases in 
understanding information. These include the inaccurate 
assessment of data, as well as tendencies towards other 
errors such as stereotyping, selective information review, 
drawing premature conclusions, and constructing 
erroneous causal explanations. These heuristics are 
linked to a number of cognitive biases, including [3]:  
 Illusory correlations – drawing an incorrect 
assumption of correlation; 
 Confirmation bias – ‘the seeking or interpreting of 
evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, 
expectations, or a hypothesis in hand’; and  
 Cognitive dissonance aversion – unconsciously 
avoiding or reducing situations of dissonance that 
arise when presented with information that leads to 
a conflict or contradiction between valued outcomes 
or ideas. 
These heuristics and biases can be political in origin, as  
they are often driven by our existing values and beliefs – 
things that are fundamentally at stake in political 
debates. As such our political interests can work to 
predispose us towards biases in the use of evidence 
through cognitive processes which act to ensure that our 
values and beliefs remain unchallenged, even in the face 
of potentially contradictory evidence. For example, this 
can explain cases where inconclusive evidence is taken as 
proof. The cognitive sciences can also provide insights 
into the widespread embrace of the language of ‘what 
works’, and the deference to evidence hierarchies to 
guide policy - critiqued by some scholars as prioritising 
methodological rigour over relevance (an example of 
issue bias). The ‘what works’ language risks depoliticising 
policymaking by unconsciously replacing the 
fundamental (but difficult) question of ‘what should we 
do?’ with the more straightforward question of ‘what has 
had an effect?’ (an example of attribute substitution). 
Further, the term ‘motivated reasoning’ is used to 
capture the ways in which our pre-existing political 
affinities unconsciously lead to biased assessments of 
policy-relevant evidence. Studies have even shown cases 
where greater scientific knowledge or numeracy is 
correlated with increased bias in the interpretation of 
data, demonstrating that the biased assessment of 
evidence is not simply driven by a lack of subject-specific 
knowledge [4]. Rather, it may be explained by ‘identity 
protective cognition’, in which individuals are motivated 
to use evidence in ways that are supported by their peer 
groups rather than by fidelity to evidence itself [5].  
Features of policy problems and mechanisms of bias 
While the nature of political debate may be competitive, 
and the nature of human cognition may be bias-prone – 
this does not necessarily mean that biased uses of 
evidence are inevitable or cannot be mitigated. This brief 
argues that by unpacking the overt and subtle 
mechanisms that manifest in bias, we are better 
positioned to expect when they may arise in the political 
arena. In particular, we can look to identify key features 
of policy problems that might engender bias in both 
overt and subtle ways. Three such policy features include 
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the complexity of the problem, the level of contestation 
(or importance), and the polarisation of the issue. 
Problem complexity 
Complexity theory distinguishes between complex 
problems and complicated problems [6]. In this 
distinction, complicated problems are typically 
multifaceted, with many component elements involved. 
A complicated policy issue, then, may be one where 
there are many outcomes of relevance to consider – 
economic costs, social acceptability etc. Such cases may 
increase the opportunity for issue bias, as a valid 
evidence base may exist for each concern, but interest 
groups might only use those bodies of evidence relevant 
to their desired goals. However, in complex (uncertain) 
situations, different forms of evidentiary bias may arise. 
For example, the sowing of doubt as a political strategy 
to undermine scientific credibility can be seen in complex 
policy issues such as climate change or tobacco control.  
Complex and complicated problems may invoke the use 
of different heuristics and their associated biases. 
Reliance on so-called intuitive ‘fast thinking’ is often seen 
when humans face a large number of choices (i.e. 
complicated situations). In theory, taking time to ‘think 
slow’ and weigh up all evidence could avoid errors. Yet, 
when faced with uncertainty, thinking ‘slow’ does not 
eliminate all unknowns, and other heuristics that deal 
with situations of partial information may still exist [7].  
Contestation/importance of the issue 
The importance of a policy decision to stakeholders 
provides a second feature of policy problems that can 
influence the mechanisms through which bias arises. 
Clearly, the more important a decision is to interest 
groups, the stronger the incentive will be to overtly 
manipulate evidence in pursuit of key goals. 
The importance of a policy decision to an individual can 
also influence unconscious biases through what has been 
termed ‘attitude strength’. Greater attitude strength has 
been shown to increase the utilisation of affective 
heuristics, resulting in associated biases such as a greater 
misperception of risks or selective information gathering. 
Attitude strength can also influence the intensity of 
cognitive dissonance felt when evidence does not align 
with values [8]. 
Problem polarisation 
Finally, problem polarisation refers to how many viable 
positions there are for individuals to take on an issue, or 
to how wide a spectrum of political viewpoints are held 
within a society. Highly polarised issues have few middle-
ground positions; therefore, in theory, such issues lead to 
greater incentives for overt evidence manipulation, as 
the implication of an unfavourable policy decision would 
be extreme for one side of a contested debate – a 
‘winner takes all’ scenario.  
The phenomenon of ‘identity protective cognition’, 
which explores bias deriving from a desire to remain 
congruent with an existing affinity group, has further 
implications when policy issues are highly polarised. For 
polarised issues with no middle ground (e.g. abortion 
debates), any evidence that is dissonant to a policy 
position would imply support for a diametrically opposed 
outcome. This increases the motivation to use evidence 
in biased ways. In a polarised policy environment, on the 
other hand, the influence of ‘identity protective 
cognition’ will be particularly strong, as individuals find 
themselves in widely divided social and personal 
networks split along political lines. In such cases, any 
interpretation of evidence that is in disagreement with 
the affinity group risks more extreme social isolation 
than would be the case in a political environment with a 
range of middle-ground positions. 
A cognitive-political model of evidentiary bias 
Combining these insights, a cognitive-political model of 
evidentiary bias can be constructed (see table overleaf) 
which maps out the key features of policy problems, 
identifying how they can generate technical and issue 
bias through both overt and subtle mechanisms. This 
model can be used as a tool to both predict when bias 
may arise, as well as to help inform strategies to mitigate 
or potentially avoid instances of evidentiary bias in 
evidence-informed policy arenas.
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Features of policy 
problems 
 
Examples sources of technical bias Example sources of issue bias 
Complexity   
a) Complicated Increased reliance on intuitive ‘fast’ thinking and 
heuristic-driven processes may manifest in 
biases such as inaccurate judgements of 
probability or drawing illusory correlations. 
By being multifaceted, complicated policies 
involve a larger number of concerns. This 
increases the chance that evidence utilised 
excludes other relevant policy considerations. 
b) Uncertain Uncertainty can drive heuristics that engender 
bias, such as deferring to established 
preferences or past experiences which may not 
accurately address the current issue. 
 
With more scientific unknowns, it is easier to 
sow doubt as a political strategy. 
In situations of uncertainty, there is a greater 
likelihood for attribute substitution to resolve 
the unconscious desire for certainty – e.g. 
pursuing what can be measured, not 
necessarily what is important. 
Contestation For issues important to stakeholders, there will 
be a diminished relative value of scientific 
accuracy. 
 
Greater issue importance reflects increased 
‘attitude strength’ – linked to stronger affective 
feelings driving bias and more intense instances 
of cognitive dissonance. 
Greater importance of policy outcomes can 
shape which ones are selected to be included 
or excluded from programme evaluations. 
 
Greater importance of the issue can lead to 
stronger incentives to review evidence 
speaking to a limited (preferred) set of social 
concerns.  
Polarisation   
a) Of the issue A ‘winner takes all’ outcome, with no option for 
compromise, can incentivise the manipulation of 
evidence to ‘win’. 
Having more to lose may increase incentives 
to review evidence speaking to a limited 
(preferred) set of social concerns. 
b) Of the 
political 
environment 
A political environment with few divided 
political groupings can lead to stronger 
motivation for identity-protective cognition. 
Polarised environments reflect the clustering 
of concerns at extremes, leading to selection 
of evidence about limited concerns.  
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